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1 DUTCH EU-POLICY REGARDING THE DIRECTIVE ON FAMILY 
REUNIFICATION 
1.1 Background 
During the period under scrutiny (2000-2003)1, migration motivated by considerations of 
family reunification or family formation accounted for approximately 45% of total 
immigration in the Netherlands.2 Family (re)unification has thereby overtaken asylum as 
primary motivation for immigration in the Netherlands. As part of a wider and highly 
politicized debate around integration and immigration, family migration has been a 
controversial and regularly discussed issue in the Dutch public realm since at least the mid-
nineties. The issue encompasses and closely relates to themes as enforced marriages 
[uithuwelijkingen], integration criteria [inburgerinsvereisten] and the impact of 
immigration policies on chances of successful integration. According to a CBS study of 20033, 
between 50 and 60 percent of second generation immigrants of the two largest immigrant 
groups, Turks and Moroccans, bring their partners from their parents country of origin. This 
high percentage has been a major cause for concern of successive Dutch governments.  
 
Since 2000, family migration has taken up a prominent position on the Dutch political 
agenda at least at three defining moments: during the preparation of the new Alien’s Act 
[Vreemdelingenwet], adopted in November 2000; during the preparation and 
implementation of the directive on family reunification, adopted in September 2003; and 
during the preparation on the Act integration abroad [Wet inburgering in het buitenland], 
adopted in March 2006. It is important to note that the Dutch EU-policy regarding the 
directive on family reunification thus took place in the wider context of continuing debates on 
the general question under what conditions third country nationals are allowed to reside in 
the Netherlands to be able to enjoy family life. 
 
1.2  Impact of the Directive on family reunification on Dutch discretionary 
powers 
From a legal point of view, the Netherlands – but the same holds for every European State – 
have traditionally enjoyed much leeway in regulating family migration. This leeway stems 
from the premise embedded in public international law that States can, by and large, decide 
for themselves which non-nationals it allows to enter and reside on its territory. The number 
of international obligations with regard to immigration law are limited and mainly sprout 
from certain human rights provisions.4 With regard to family migration, State discretionary 
powers are predominantly curtailed by article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (hereafter: ECHR), which lays down the principle that everyone has the right to 
respect for his family life. The European Court of Human Rights (hereafter: ECtHR) has 
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interpreted this provision as encompassing, under circumstances, an obligation for State 
Parties to grant a right of residence to non-nationals for reasons of family reunification, for 
example when it is impossible for the family to enjoy family life in one of the spouses 
countries of origin. 
 
The adoption of the EC Directive on family reunification in September 2003 has further 
circumcised the discretionary powers of European States in this field of law. The drafting of 
the directive took place as a direct consequence of the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty (1999), which placed the issues of migration, asylum, visa and border controls in a 
new title IV in the EC Treaty and set out an ambitious time-table within which results on 
these policy fields should be achieved. The topic of family reunification is expressly 
mentioned in art. 63 (3)(a) in the EC Treaty, thus obliging Member States to take concerted 
actions in this field. 
 
The Commission presented its first proposal on 1 December 19995, political agreement was 
not reached until February 2003, paving the way for adoption of the directive in September 
that year. The directive lays down under what circumstances Member States are obliged to 
grant a right of family reunification to non EU-nationals who reside legally on their territory. 
The fact that a right to family reunification has been agreed upon on European level is in 
itself a major political achievement, since such a right has never been recognized before on 
the international plane. Nevertheless, the end-result of the negotiating process is rather 
modest. The directive only lays down minimum standards, from which Member States can 
deviate in favor of the immigrant(s) concerned, and the directive did not force most of the 
Member States, including the Netherlands, to carry through major adaptations of existing 
immigration legislation. 
 
The directive applies to third country nationals (non-EU nationals) legally residing in one of 
the Members States who want to be (re)united with family residing outside EU territory. 
Fundamental background of the directive is the establishment of a compromise between the 
individual right to be able to enjoy family life and the discretionary power States want to 
maintain in issues of immigration in order to promote and protect interests of public order, 
security and social cohesion. The outcome of this compromise in the directive is that 
members of the nuclear family (the spouse and minor children) must be granted a right to 
family (re)unification, provided that both the sponsor and the family member meet certain 
conditions, like age-, income- and integration requirements and do not pose a threat to 
public order, public security or public health. Alternatively, the directive lays down a regime 
according to which Member States are allowed to grant a right to family (re)unification to 
other family members, such as parents or children of age. When Member States decide to 
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extent the right to family reunification to these categories, they are obliged to abide by the 
minimum standards enshrined in the directive.  
 
1.3  Stakeholders of the directive: winners & losers 
Roughly two categories of stakeholders of the directive can be defined. The obvious first one 
is comprised of third country nationals who wish to develop family life in the Netherlands. 
As said above, the final version of the Directive did not force the Netherlands into major 
adaptations of its family migration laws. Nevertheless, some restrictions for family 
reunification have been scaled down as a result of adoption of the directive. The existing 
waiting period of three years before being able assert the right to family reunification for 
third country nationals who themselves had come to the Netherlands for reasons of family 
reunification, has been abolished. The directive furthermore made it necessary to insert a 
new provision in the Ministerial Act concerning Aliens [Vreemdelingenbesluit] with regard to 
the right of family reunification for minor refugees, stipulating that this category enjoys a less 
strict regime of conditions than ‘ordinary’ immigrants.6 Perhaps more importantly, in 
December 2005, the District Court of Haarlem [Rechtbank Haarlem] ruled that the existing 
condition in Dutch law of the presence of a ‘factual family relationship’, which was deemed to 
be inexistent when children had been separated from their parents for a period longer than 
five years, was in conflict with the corresponding provision in the directive.7
 
On the other hand, the generally low standards enshrined in the directive allowed the Dutch 
government to carry through a number of reforms which have severely restricted the 
possibilities for third country nationals to apply for family reunification from 2003 onwards. 
In 2004, the Netherlands raised the age requirement for spouses wishing to be united from 
18 to 21 years and raised the income requirement of the sponsor residing in the Netherlands 
from 100% to 120% of the minimum wage. And in March 2006, a new Act on integration 
abroad [Wet inburgering buitenland] was adopted, which obliges family migrants to follow 
certain integration courses/tests (in Dutch language and on practices in Dutch society) in 
their host country before they are allowed entry in the Netherlands. 
 
The second category of stakeholders can best be defined as Dutch society, represented by the 
Dutch parliament and the Dutch government. Since the late nineties, migration policies in 
the Netherlands got increasingly politicized due to factors which lie outside the scope of this 
paper. It suffices to say here that the societal support for taking in new immigrants has 
significantly decreased. The Dutch government, correspondingly, has sharpened its laws on 
entry and residence of immigrants (most notably with the adoption of the new Alien’s Act 
[Vreemdelingenwet] in 2000). With regard to family migration, the high financial and 
societal costs involved in processing and harboring these newcomers, led to the common 
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conception that the influx of family migrants had to be curtailed, without denying certain 
categories of individuals basic rights however. The final version of the directive on family 
reunification can generally be regarded as paying due regard to Dutch societal interests. 
Although the discretionary powers of Dutch government have been reduced and minor 
aspects of Dutch family migration rules have in fact been liberalised as a result of the 
directive, the directive did not put a stop to the comprehensive and weighty reforms which 
took place after 2003 with regard to requirements attached to the right to family 
reunification. 
 
1.4 Decision-making at EU-level: key decisions and the role of the 
Netherlands 
In figure 1, a timetable is presented with key dates and events in the negotiating process on 
the directive on family reunification on both EU and national level. This subparagraph 
focuses on the negotiations on the family reunification directive which took place between 
1999 en September 2003 at EU level and will describe the position of the Dutch government 
during these negotiations. The next paragraph will analyze the discussions at national level. 
 
The Commission presented its first proposal on 1 December 19998. On 6 September 2000 the 
European Parliament (EP) adopted its opinion in plenary.9 The EP supported the general 
approach and main orientations of the Commission but called for a restriction with regard to 
so-called subsidiary protection beneficiaries and requested the introduction of a stand-still 
clause. Based on the EP’s amendments, the Commission presented an Amended proposal on 
10 October 2000.10 During the years 2000 and 2001, the Commission’s proposals were 
heavily debated in the Council. In 2000, mainly in the Working Party on Migration and 
Expulsion and the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum; 11 and in the 
year 2001 COREPER got increasingly involved. 
 
The Dutch negotiations conducted during the years 2000 and 2001 took place under 
responsibility of State Secretaries of Justice Cohen (PvdA) and Kalsbeek (PvdA).12 The 
government’s (Kok-II: PvdA, VVD, D66) position on family migration in these years was not 
clear-cut. The coalition agreement of 1998 only contained one (Chapter VI-1-i) sentence on 
the subject of family migration, which held that the income requirement of the sponsor who 
wishes to be united with family living outside the EU should be set at the social assistance 
level [bijstandsniveau]. A close reading of Council documents of the years 2000-2001 shows 
that the Dutch delegation has not been overly active at the start of the negotiations, which at 
that time mainly evolved around questions of the personal scope of the directive.13 What does 
become clear from the relevant documents is that the Dutch delegation tried to accomplish 
that the directive would not be confined to family reunification but would also apply to family 
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formation, i.e. situations where family relationships come into existence after the sponsor has 
left his country of origin. Another Dutch objective was to uphold the Commission’s intention 
to extend the scope of the directive to non-married partners.14 It must be noted here as well 
that, from the start, the Dutch delegation upheld a parliamentary scrutiny reservation, in 
accordance with the agreement between Dutch Parliament and government concluded during 
the ratification process of the Treaty of Amsterdam.15
 
In the year 2001, the Dutch negotiators took a more distinct position, which can perhaps best 
be described as driven by the goal to uphold standards and procedures as enshrined in the 
then recently adopted Alien’s Act [Vreemdelingenwet 2000] and the ministerial Act on 
Aliens [Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000].16 The negotiating position of the Dutch government 
was further based on a policy paper adopted in January 2001 ‘Integratie in het perspectief 
van immigratie’ [Integration in the perspective of immigration], in which some clear goals 
with regard to family migration were formulated.17 Two prominent Dutch demands were (1.) 
to lengthen the term within which immigration authorities had to decide on a request for 
family reunification (from 6 to 9 months) and (2.) to insert a requirement in the directive 
that children should not only have legal, but also genuine ties with the family.18 Both 
demands were in conformity with Dutch practice at that time. 
 
Council negotiations in 2001 eventually resulted in a deadlock. Major controversies existed 
around a number of subjects, the most important ones being (1.) the category of persons 
eligible for family reunification; (2.) the legal position of non-married partners; and (3.) the 
maximum age of minor children eligible for family reunification. In order to give the 
negotiations a new impetus, the European Council in Laeken (December 2001) requested the 
Commission to present a second Amended proposal, which the Commission made public on 
2 May 2002. 
At that time, the Dutch political scene underwent some drastic changes. The assassination of 
Pim Fortuyn (6 May 2002), who had advocated a far more stringent position on immigrants, 
could not prevent the huge electoral success of his right-wing LPF-party at the parliamentary 
elections of 15 May 2002. The new political landscape eventually resulted in the installment 
of the centre-right cabinet Balkenende-I on the 22nd of July 2002, which included the LPF-
party. In contrast with the rather extensive coalition agreement of 1998, which only 
contained one sentence on family migration, the rather short Strategic agreement 
[Strategisch Akkoord] of the new cabinet contained an extensive paragraph on immigration, 
with three outspoken goals regarding family migration.19 All three goals were drafted with a 
view to promote chances of successful integration of newcomers in the Netherlands. The first 
one was to raise the minimum age requirement for family formation (marriages with 
partners living abroad) from 18 to 21 years. Secondly, the new cabinet agreed to raise the 
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minimum income requirement of the sponsor to 130% of the minimum wage. Thirdly, the 
goal was set to lower the maximum age of minor children eligible for family reunification, 
without stipulating what this maximum exactly should be. 
 
The installment of the new cabinet coincided with the resumption of Council discussions in 
the summer of 2002. Direct responsible for the negotiations was the new Minister of Aliens 
Affairs and Integration, Nawijn (LPF). The outspoken cabinet goals in issues of migration 
and integration led to an increased sense of involvement on the side of the Dutch at the 
negotiating table. The Dutch government was aware of the fact that the present form of the 
draft directive could impede the intended reforms to the Dutch regime of family migration. 
The primary goal of cabinet Balkenende-I was therefore to ensure that no new provisions 
which could possibly hamper planned reforms got inserted and more importantly, to amend 
a number of provisions which were deemed not to be in accordance with the coalition 
agreement. During the last months of 2002 and the first months of 2003, Dutch negotiators 
– clearly conscientiously instructed by the Minister/government – took up a firm negotiating 
position and persisted in their efforts to reach certain results. Hereunder, the most pregnant 
examples of the more resolute Dutch stance in Brussels are presented. 
 
At a meeting of the Working Party on Migration and Expulsion on 26 July 2002, the Dutch 
delegation made a scrutiny reservation to the provision on the minimum age of spouses who 
want to form a family, in order to pay due regard to the government’s intention to raise this 
minimum age to 21 years.20 In concerted action with the German and Austrian delegation, at 
a meeting of the Working Party in the beginning of October 200221, the Netherlands 
proposed to insert a new ‘integration’ requirement in the Directive, which was driven by 
Dutch government intentions to oblige newcomers to follow integration tests before they are 
allowed entry in the Netherlands. During all negotiations in the last months of 2002, the 
Dutch delegation furthermore upheld a scrutiny reservation on the provision regarding the 
minimum income of the sponsor. 
 
The final negotiations on the directive took place in January and February 2003, eventually 
leading to a political agreement reached at ministerial level (Council of Ministers of Justice 
and Home Affairs) on 27-28 February 2003. In these defining first two months of 2003, the 
Dutch delegation booked a couple of remarkable successes. The first one was that the 
provision concerning the possibility to make use of an integration requirement was 
maintained, even though a number of Member States strongly objected to it.22 Secondly, the 
Austrian demand which was supported by the Dutch, that the maximum age for children 
eligible for family reunification could be lowered to 15 years of age was inserted in the 
directive. Thirdly, notwithstanding the pressure of some southern Member States (most 
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notably Greece and Spain), a provision on the possibility of equal treatment of non-married 
partners was maintained.23 Furthermore, the Dutch delegation booked two clear victories 
with the insertion of two entirely new provisions, agreed upon during the Council meeting of 
27-28 February. The first one was that the less strict regime for refugees would not apply 
when the request for family reunification was submitted after three months of the grant of a 
residence permit. This Dutch demand directly originated from the state of Dutch law at the 
time. Perhaps more importantly, the provision on the minimum age for spouses eligible for 
family formation was altered in order to allow Member States to raise this age requirement to 
21 years.24
 
From the point of view of the Dutch government, the political agreement reached clearly lived 
up to the goals as set in the summer of 2002. The end-result was by and large in conformity 
with present Dutch practices on family migration requirements and, more importantly, 
would not hamper the planned reforms. 
 
The Directive got formally adopted unchanged at the Council meeting of 22 September 2003. 
At special request of the Dutch Parliament [Eerste Kamer] however, the Dutch government 
added a declaration to the Council minutes, stipulating that ‘the directive should be applied 
in conformity with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms’.25 Reasons for this declaration are presented in the next paragraph. 
 
In Council meetings between March 2003 and the date of formal adoption, no regard was 
paid to the European Parliament’s opinion of 9 April 200326 whereby the EP had presented 
71 amendments to the second Amended proposal of the Commission. These amendments for 
the large part tried to undo some of the more strict conditions which the Commission had 
introduced in May 2002. In fact, preparatory EP discussions in the Committee on Citizens' 
Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, on the Commission’s proposal had taken 
place at the same time as the crucial Council meetings in January and February 2003, 
without any cross-fertilization between the two EU institutions however. The opinion 
adopted by the EP did not even contain a reference to the political agreement reached at the 
Council one month earlier. The EP’s work was therefore completely in vain and testimony of 









Figure 1. Key events in the negotiation process on the directive on family reunification 
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1.5  Decision-making at national level: key decisions and the interplay 
between government and parliament 
The Directive on family reunification was subject of debate on a number of occasions in 
Dutch Parliament. This paragraph will describe the way Dutch parliament has controlled and 
tried to assert influence over the Dutch government’s position in Council discussions. 
Formally, Dutch parliament had a firm control over the eventual outcome, since Dutch 
approval was made conditional on Parliamentary approval.27 Dutch parliamentary scrutiny 
over the Dutch government’s policy with regard to the directive on family reunification took 
place mainly during combined sessions of the permanent committees on Justice and Home 
Affairs [Algemeen overleg vaste commissies voor Justitie en voor Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties] on activities of the Council of Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs 
[JBZ-raad]. These sessions are meant to assert control over EU developments in the sphere 
of Justice and Home Affairs and take place in between Council meetings, on the basis of 
reports of past Council meetings and the agenda for upcoming meetings. 
 
In 2000, the Commission’s proposal for a directive on family reunification was referred to 
during two sessions of the permanent committees on Justice and Home Affairs.28 Questions 
asked by various MP’s29 concerned the desirable scope of the directive – minimum- or total 
harmonization – and the conformity of the Commission’s proposal with the draft of the new 
Dutch Aliens Act. No discussions on the actual contents of the Commission’s proposal took 
place during these meetings. The government’s response was confined to the statement that 
requirements relating to family (re)unification would be inserted in the Ministerial Act on 
Aliens [Vreemdelingenbesluit] and that, with a view to the present stage of negotiations in 
Brussels, no concrete answers could be given about consequences of the directive for Dutch 
practice.30 Parliament did not mandate government, nor force the government to take up 
certain bargaining positions. 
 
As concluded in the paragraph above, the input of the Dutch government during Council 
meetings in 2001 can in general be said to be driven by the goal to uphold standards and 
requirements as laid down in the Vreemdelingenwet and Vreemdelingenbesluit, which were 
enacted in November 2000. During parliamentary debates which took place in May and 
September 2001, the government’s input in the Council was criticized by left wing parties 
Groen Links and PvdA, who considered the government’s reservations as an undesirable 
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downgrading of the right to family reunification.31 MP’s Vos (Groen Links) and Albayrak 
(PvdA) expressed concerns with regard to the Dutch demand to insert the requirement of a 
‘factual family relationship’ in the directive and the lengthening of the decision period within 
which immigration services had to decide on an application. Other factions in parliament did 
not scrutinize the actual negotiating position of Dutch government in Council meetings, 
although a discussion did evolve around the question whether non-married partners should 
receive equal treatment as spouses.32
 
After the Laeken decision to request the Commisson to present a second Amended proposal, 
Council negotiations did not resume before July 2002. The politicization of the issue of 
family migration at national level had by then become increasingly manifest, with a number 
of parties (VVD, CDA, LPF) advocating a far more strict regime for family migrants, while the 
PvdA and Groen Links maintained a more moderate position. In November and December 
2002, family migration was heavily debated in Parliament,33 with one of the most prominent 
outcomes the adoption by majority of Parliament of Motie-Sterk,34 which called for the 
drafting of legislation obliging certain categories of family migrants to follow integration 
courses before they are allowed entry in the Netherlands. During these debates on integration 
and entry requirements, no referrals were made to the directive on family reunification. 
 
Perhaps more strikingly, parliamentary scrutiny with regard to Council discussions on the 
directive during or before the crucial Council negotiations in the last months of 2002 and the 
first months of 2003 was practically absent. Only the VVD (Blok) did on two occasions in 
November and December 2002 request responsible Minister Nawijn to make sure that the 
directive would not hamper the Dutch intention to set up integration tests in the country of 
origin.35 The reasons for absence of closer parliamentary control at this stage are rather 
plain. During the parliamentary session on the JHA Council of 18 December 2002, the 
directive was not discussed since the JHA Council had withdrawn the directive from its 
agenda of 19 December 2002. The Council preferred to await the outcome of preparatory 
discussions at working group level at that stage. The agenda of the permanent committees of 
the Tweede Kamer had simply mirrored the Council’s agenda and obviously, did not mirror 
the agenda of discussions at working group level – as conducted by the Working Party on 
Migration and Expulsion, the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum 
and COREPER. Furthermore, no joint session of the permanent committees on activities of 
the JHA Council took place before the crucial Council meeting of 27-28 February 2003, due 




This meant that parliamentary scrutiny over the directive did resume only after political 
agreement at EU level was reached. By letter of 17 March 2003, the Minister had asked 
parliament to withdraw its reservation to the directive.37 During a session of the permanent 
committees on Justice and Home Affairs on 26 March 2003, the by far most substantial 
debate on the directive since the start of EU negotiations took place in the Tweede Kamer.38 
The political agreement was heavily discussed, with a clear dichotomy in parliament between 
PvdA, D66 and Groen Links on the one hand, whose general proposition was that the 
amended directive fell short of human rights standards, and the coalition parties VVD, LPF 
and CDA on the other hand, who in general were satisfied with the result and who 
complimented the Minister with the Dutch negotiating successes. The left wing-parties 
referred to a letter of the Standing committee of experts on international immigration, 
refugee and criminal law [commissie-Meijers],39 sent to both the Eerste and Tweede Kamer, 
in which the committee had stressed that the amendments made by the Council with regard 
to i.e. waiting periods, decision terms and the right to a legal remedy, did not meet the 
minimum standards of article 8 ECHR. 
 
Discussions were resumed in the Tweede Kamer at 7 May 2003, 40 which in fact was the last 
debate in the Tweede kamer on the merits of the directive. PvdA and Groen Links repeated 
their arguments and concluded that they could not agree with the withdrawal of the 
parliamentary reservation. Since the Eerste Kamer had by then raised a number of questions 
regarding the directive, the Tweede kamer decided to leave the decision whether parliament 
should lift its reservation to the Eerste Kamer. 
 
The involvement of the Eerste Kamer with the scrutiny over the directive started with a letter 
sent by this Chamber on 18 Februray 2003 to Minister Nawijn, in which it demanded a 
written reply to the comments made about the directive by the commissie-Meijers.41 The 
Minister replied on 24 March 2003 and maintained that the directive did not fall short of the 
standards of art. 8 ECHR.42 An extensive debate on the question whether the directive was 
compatible with 8 ECHR ensued on the 13th of May in the Eerste Kamer’s special commission 
on the Council of Justice and Home Affairs [bijzondere commissie voor de JBZ-raad].43 A 
majority (CDA, Groen Links, PvdA, D66) expressed grave concerns about the level of 
protection offered by the directive and regretted that the directive did not contain an explicit 
reference to article 8 ECHR.44 The Minister defended the political agreement by stipulating 
that the agreed text was reached after years of hazardous negotiations and that a higher level 
of harmonization had simply not been feasible. The Minister did bring forward that he agreed 




The Eerste Kamer persisted in its opinion that at least an explicit reference to art. 8 ECHR 
should be inserted in the directive and requested the Minister on 20 May to re-open the 
negotiations in the Council in order to amend the directive accordingly.45 The Eerste Kamer 
made this request in full awareness of the fact that this would place the Minister in an 
awkward and unpopular position in the Council, but the serious and legitimate concerns 
outweighed these risks, according to the Eerste Kamer. The Minister, however, was by no 
means inclined to comply with the Eerste Kamer’s demand. In his reply of 27 May 2003,46 
the Minister for the sake of convenience dismissed his earlier statement that an insertion of 
an explicit reference to art. 8 ECHR would have added value and moreover warned the Eerste 
Kamer that a request for further amendment of the directive would open Pandora’s box. Not 
only would a re-opening of negotiations severely delay the process of harmonizing migration 
law at European level but it would also undermine the reached compromise, thereby risking 
that other Member States would follow the Dutch example and propose amendments on their 
behalf as well. 
 
A majority of the Eerste Kamer decided not to press on from here, apparently to avoid the 
risk of being scapegoated for another standstill, or at least substantial delay, of the 
harmonization process. Instead of a request for an amendment to the directive itself, the 
Eerste Kamer reported to the Minister – by now ms. Verdonk (VVD), who had replaced 
Nawijn on the 27th of May – that it would lift its reservation to the directive, but only if the 
Minister would add a declaration in public to the Council minutes, in which she would 
indicate that the directive should at all times be interpreted in accordance with the standards 
enshrined in art. 8 ECHR.47 Apparently satisfied that conflict could be avoided by this 
proposal, the Minister decided to settle the dispute accordingly.48 The Dutch government’s 
declaration was made at the Council of Justice and Home Affairs of June 2003,49 thereby 
taking away the last obstacle for formal adoption of the Directive. 
 
1.6 Interim conclusions on Dutch decision-making 
The narrative presented above offers a fairly comprehensive description of the decision-
making process of the directive both at EU and Dutch level. A number of conclusions can be 
drawn with regard to the role played by Dutch government and parliament, respectively. 
 
Role of Dutch government 
With regard to the Dutch government, the main conclusion is that, apart from the year 2000, 
its role in Council negotiations has been fairly active and driven by a number of clearly 
defined goals. The attitude of government did change during the negotiations, mainly as a 
result of the installment of cabinet Balkenende-I. During Kok-II, the government pleaded for 
a high level of harmonization in the directive and wanted the scope of the directive to extent 
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to issues such as subsidiary protection, family formation and non-married partners. At the 
same time however, the Dutch government conscientiously tried to ensure that it could 
uphold its recently adopted migration laws and, consequently, pressed for the sharpening of 
a number of procedural rules in the directive. 
 
The entry into office of cabinet Balkenende-I, which was founded on a coalition agreement in 
which clear objectives with regard to family migration were formulated, resulted in an 
increased sense of involvement and steadfastness on the side of the Dutch at the negotiating 
table. Undoubtedly, the clear and resolute stance taken by the Dutch delegation cultivated the 
negotiating successes of the first months of 2003. A conclusion which can be added here – 
and which can be drawn from a close reading of the relevant Council documents – is that 
both cabinet Kok-II and Balkende-I have closely instructed the Dutch negotiators and have at 
all times defended Dutch interests – as defined and interpreted by government. 
 
Role of  Dutch parliament  
The role of Dutch parliament in the negotiating process on the directive can in general be 
described as reactive rather than proactive. At no time before or during the negotiations at 
EU level, did parliament spend an exclusive debate on the directive, in which it could have 
laid down or at least discussed the preferred negotiating position of the Dutch government. 
In the Tweede kamer, debates on the directive took place as part of general debates on the 
results of past JHA Council meetings and the agenda of future meetings. The structure of 
these debates is guided by a pick-and-choose mentality of MP’s, who – understandably – only 
discuss the items on the JHA agenda they consider most relevant. Although a number of 
MP’s did regularly comment on the directive on family reunification (most notably Albayrak 
(PvdA) and Vos (GL)), these comments therefore often took the character of solemn 
declarations or footloose remarks, since a concrete follow-up in parliamentary discussions 
was absent. At no time during parliamentary sessions were any votes cast on the directive, for 
example on moties expressing preferred negotiating positions. The end-result was that Dutch 
government had a fairly wide discretionary power in devising its own negotiating position, 
without a firm control asserted by Dutch parliament. 
 
A close parliamentary scrutiny of the directive did take place, but only after political 
agreement at EU level was reached on 27-28 February 2003. The outcome was first 
extensively discussed in the Tweede kamer on 26 March 2003, with elaborate contributions 
by a majority of parties (PvdA, CDA, VVD, GL, LPF, D66).50 Most remarkable aspect of the 
Dutch parliamentary role is undoubtedly the pronounced position of the Eerste Kamer on 
the question of compatibility of the directive with art. 8 ECHR in the period March-May 
2003. Nevertheless, the proposition that this pronounced position came too late in the day 
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[‘mosterd na de maaltijd’] can certainly be defended. Council negotiations on the directive 
had been going on for over three years and had suffered from deadlock on a number of 
occasions. Two amended proposals by the Commission had been necessary to facilitate a 
break-through. Although the Eerste Kamer did have the possibility – and perhaps very good 
reason – to make its approval conditional on an amendment to the directive, such a course of 
action would have brought the Dutch government in an awkward position and could have 
lead to another stalemate at EU level. 
 
What is striking in this respect is that the Dutch government’s negotiators had not, at least 
since the summer of 2002, insisted that an explicit reference to article 8 ECHR got inserted 
in the directive. Since such a reference could probably count on the support of a number of 
other Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission, an earlier Dutch 
request – for instance at the end of 2002 – for such a reference would not have been without 
chances. This conclusion implies that an earlier involvement of the Eerste Kamer, or a more 
proactive attitude of the Tweede kamer, could have lead to a result which did contain a 
reference to art. 8 ECHR. 
 
Embedding of the directive on family reunification in Dutch migration policies 
While the topic of family migration became increasingly politicized in the Netherlands since 
the late nineties, the EU family reunification directive did not play an important role in 
debates relating to family migration in the Dutch political realm.51 Instead of an integral 
approach to the topic at both national and EU-level, the issue of family reunification was 
treated as a pure national issue with the EU directive being perceived mainly as possible 
obstacle to national policies and policy proposals. While with regard to the national policies 
on family reunification fundamental debates and the drafting of numerous reports 
concerning, inter alia, integration-, age- and income-requirements formed an integral part of 
the national decision-making process, eventually fueling legislative changes; the negotiating 
position of government in Brussels and the parliamentary scrutiny over this position was 
mainly based on existing conditions in Dutch law and practice, with as goal to uphold 
national standards and to incorporate proposed changes of the national regime in the 
directive. This approach become more manifest with the installment of cabinet Balkenende-I.  
 
The directive on family reunification was therefore perceived both by government and a 
majority of Parliament – with as possible exception left-wing parties Groen Links and PvdA – 
mainly as an obstacle – or threat – to the Dutch regime of family reunification instead of a 
chance to lay down a common European regime which would ensure both fair treatment of 
third country nationals equally across the EU while at the same time promoting sociocultural 
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stability by way of facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the Member States.
  
1.7  Media Coverage 
For reasons of expedience, this paragraph confines itself to an analysis of coverage by three 
daily newspapers in the Netherlands on the topics of family reunification in general and the 
directive on family reunification in particular. Selected newspapers are de Volkskrant, de 
Telegraaf and Trouw. Both this selection and the choice not to analyze other forms of media 
are rather arbitrary, but the premise is that a scrutiny of the coverage in these three 
newspapers will nevertheless serve the purposes of this paragraph; that is to establish to what 
extent the directive has played a role in debates in Dutch media, and to what extent the 
coverage on the directive formed an integral (or embedded) part of the wider debate in the 
Netherlands on the issue of family migration. 
 
A quick glance at figure 2 immediately presents an obvious answer to both questions. The 
general picture is that, although the topic of family migration as such has received huge 
media attention since the year 2000, coverage on the directive on family reunification has 
been practically non-existent. A quantitative analysis further shows that coverage on the 
general topic of family migration takes place at least weekly, with often several articles per 
week, and with a culminating point in the year 2002, the year of the rise of Pim Fortuyn and 
entry into office of cabinet Balkenende-I. In contrast, the directive on family reunification has 
been subject of coverage only sporadically and, paradoxically, only after the negotiations and 
formal adoption of the directive. Almost all articles referring to the directive were published 
in the years 2004 and 2005, most notably as a consequence of possible obstacles which the 
directive raised with regard to new government policies or policy proposals on the issue of 
family migration. 
 
Figure 2. Quantitative analysis of coverage in 3 selected newspapers on family reunification and the directive on 
family reunification (period 1/1/2000-1/6/2006)52
 Volkskrant Telegraaf Trouw 
# Articles on general topic of family 
reunification/family migration) 
(keywords ‘gezinshereniging’, ‘gezinsmigratie’, 
‘huwelijksmigratie’) 
230 58 188 
# Articles mentioning the directive on family 
reunification 
(keywords ‘gezinsherenigingsrichtlijn’,’richtlijn 
gezinshereniging’, ‘europese regel(s) 
gezinshereniging’) 
5 2 8 
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A qualitative analysis of coverage in the three selected newspapers shows that, in the years 
2000 and 2001, articles on the topic of family reunification often dealt with inherent dangers 
and potential merits of requirements imposed on family migrants and, as such, were part of 
the wider debate with regard to the sharpening of Dutch immigration rules. Policy proposals 
regarding, i.e. DNA-tests of potential family migrants and the introduction of an income 
requirement were discussed in all selected newspapers. On a more general level, the dangers 
(and merits) of the phenomenon of family formation were commented upon, in close 
connection to the impact of this phenomenon on the integration of immigrants (especially 
Turks and Moroccans) in Dutch society. 
 
In the years 2002 and 2003, the above trend of coverage continued, but the topic of family 
migration was increasingly placed in the context of the parliamentary elections which took 
place in May 2002 and January 2003. The issue of family migration played a major role 
during the electoral campaigns leading up to both elections, mainly due to the fact that Pim 
Fortuyn/LPF wanted to severely restrict the possibilities for family (re)unification, for 
example with regard to second generation immigrants who prefer to marry a partner from 
their parents home country and children above 12 years of age. All selected newspapers 
reported extensively on the family migration-paragraph in the coalition agreements of 
cabinets Balkenende-I and II. Policy proposals concerning integration requirements, income 
requirements and age requirements were extensively scrutinized and debated. 
 
In the period 2004-2006, coverage on the topic of family reunification got increasingly 
diversified, reflecting – perhaps – the comprehensive nature of the issue. Family 
reunification in all selected newspapers was discussed in relation to: integration 
requirements, terrorism, chances of successful integration, fundamental rights, enforced 
marriages, knowledge migrants [kennismigranten], etc. Especially de Volkskrant and Trouw 
regularly reported on problems ensuing from recently adopted family migration rules, for 
example by way of narratives of individual cases. In general, the coverage in 2004-2006 can 
be said to be of a more ‘reflective nature’. 
 
The directive on family reunification did not play a role of significance in the media coverage 
on the general topic of family reunification. None of the newspapers reported on the 
negotiating process on the directive (at EU or national level), the formal adoption of the 
directive, nor on the political agreement reached in February 2003. With only very few 
exceptions, the articles referring to the directive were published in the years 2004/2005 and, 
without exception, all these latter articles concerned the question of compatibility of recently 
adopted Dutch legislation with the directive. In 2004 both the Volkskrant and Trouw 
reported on the proposed Dutch prerequisite for family reunification to follow integration 
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tests abroad in relation to the directive. In 2004 and 2005 a handful of articles were devoted 
to the Dutch practice of considering a period of separation of children and parents of more 
than 5 years as testimony of the non-existence of a genuine family relationship, and the 
ruling of the District Court Haarlem (December 2005) that this practice was contrary to the 
directive. Another article (published in de Volkskrant) concerned the question whether 
administrative fees imposed on family migrants were allowed by the directive. 
 
1.8  Role of Dutch society, NGO’s, expert groups. 
Based on deductive reasoning and common knowledge, the conclusion that a large majority 
of Dutch citizens was ignorant – and still is ignorant – about the existence of the directive on 
family reunification is presented here as fact. This fact implies that public debates on the 
directive during the negotiating process have only rarely taken place and did not have a 
substantial impact on Dutch EU-policymaking with regard to the directive. This conclusion is 
supported by the above presented analysis of media coverage on the directive. 
 
In fact, societal – or non-parliamentary – influence over the Dutch EU-policy with regard to 
the directive was channeled through a fairly limited number of actors, consisting of NGO’s, 
expert groups and advisory institutions. The most prominent role in this respect was played 
by the Standing committee of experts on international immigration, refugee and criminal law 
[commissie-Meijers], who had on 17 February 2003 (before the crucial JHA Council meeting 
of 27-28 February) sent a letter to Dutch parliament in which it called for rejection of the 
directive in the present form. The motivations of the commissie-Meijers were set out in a 
letter dated three days later, which it send to EU Commissioner Vitorino of Justice and Home 
Affairs.53 The debates in the Eerste Kamer and exchange of letters between the Eerste Kamer 
and the Minister of Aliens Affairs and Integration, eventually leading to the formal Dutch 
declaration inserted in a special Council document, can be directly attributed to the activities 
of the commissie-Meijers, with which it lived up to its statutory goals.54
 
Apart from the role of the commissie-Meijers, non-parliamentary influence over the decision-
making process was occasionally asserted by NGO’s protecting rights of migrants and 
minorities. A number of relatively small NGO’s in the Netherlands deal exclusively with 
matters of family reunification/-formation. Two of these, the Stichting Lawine (organization 
for Dutch women with foreign partners) and Buitenlandse Partner/Actiecomité Referenten 
(interest group for Dutch citizens with foreign partners), presented in May 2002, in a 
combined effort, a report to parliament recommending a number of amendments to Dutch 
practices regarding family reunification, on the basis of which questions were asked to the 
Minister.55 The recommendations laid down in the report were partly based on the draft 
directive on family reunification, which at that time was less strict than Dutch practice. 
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However, both interest groups clearly lost interest in the directive when it became clear that 
the directive would not apply to Dutch nationals. 
 
A number of bigger NGO’s traditionally play a very active role in the Dutch public realm with 
regard to migration issues: especially Amnesty International, Vluchtelingenwerk and Defence 
for Children. All these NGO’s have regularly reported on issues of family migration, most 
notably in reaction to the new Aliens Act of 2000 and the additional restrictions imposed on 
the right to family (re)unification by cabinets Balkenende-I and II.56 However, analogous to 
conclusions drawn above with regard to media coverage and parliamentary discussions, most 
NGO activities related directly to cabinet proposals and practical consequences of the stricter 
national regime of family reunification, with only occasional referrals to the directive on 
family reunification. Whereas international NGO’s like the European Council on Refugees 
and Exiles (ECRE)57 did have a keen eye for the potential impact of the EC Directive and 
closely monitored developments in the negotiating process; key discussions or differences of 
opinion between EU institutions (Council/Commission/EP) and between Member States 
were only scarcely commented upon by Dutch NGO’s. Again, a close scrutiny of reports, 
policy statements and press releases shows that in the cases whereby NGO’s did comment on 
the directive, these comments, in general, related to new government’s proposals or current 
practices which were in potential conflict with the adopted text. 
 
With regard to European harmonization in the sphere of family migration, two formal 
advisory bodies to the government have presented reports upon past and future 
developments: the Advisory council for International Affairs [Adviesraad Internationale 
Vraagstukken](AIV) and the Advisory commission for Aliens Affairs [Adviescommissie voor 
Vreemdelingenzaken](ACVZ). The ACVZ was set up in November 2001 as prescribed by the 
new Aliens Act and has, in its limited years of existence, presented numerous advises on or 
relating to family migration.58 At the government’s request, one advice (February 2004) was 
given on Dutch changes in the regime of family reunification as agreed to in the coalition 
agreement of 2003 and necessitated by the adoption of the family reunification directive. In 
this advice, the ACVZ examined the compatibility of proposed policy changes with conditions 
laid down in the directive.59 Furthermore, several ACVZ advices on the issue of integration 
tests [inburgering], referred to standards enshrined in the directive.60 General tendency of 
the advices was that additional requirements imposed on family migrants can in principle be 
justified, but with due regard to minimum standards as guaranteed by both the directive and 
the ECHR. 
 
Neither the AIV nor the ACVZ commented upon the Commission proposals for the directive 
of 1999, 2000 and 2002, nor on the decision-making process on the directive in general. In 
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2004 however, both advisory bodies presented at their own initiative separate advises to 
government about future EU policies with regard to asylum and migration (the so-called 
second phase of integration from 2004 onwards).61 These advices were presented with a view 
to the Dutch presidency of the Council in the last six months of 2004. In both documents the 
achievements of integration in the field of asylum and migration are evaluated and 
recommendations are made with regard to future EU policies on family migration. Both 
documents contain an appraisal of the directive on family reunification and present a 
fundamental perspective on future harmonization efforts in the sphere of family migration. 
The conclusions of the ACVZ and the AIV are fairly similar: apart from minor aspects, the 
present directive offers a sufficient level of harmonization; guaranteeing basic rights and a 
common level of protection to third country nationals on the one hand, and leaving an 
appropriate amount of discretion to Member States to protect national interests relating to 
social security and public order on the other hand. Both bodies therefore propose to maintain 
the current level of integration; Member States must continue to cooperate and share best 
practices, but the EU should not further circumcise State sovereignties in this respect.62  
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2 ASSESSMENT OF POLITICIZATION AND POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY 
REGARDING THE DIRECTIVE ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION 
 
As outlined above, the directive on family reunification has scarcely been politicized in the 
Dutch public realm. Explanations for the lack of politicization of the issue and the relating 
lack of ‘embedding’ in both the political and societal sphere are presented hereunder. 
  
2.1  Media 
The lack of embedding of the directive in Dutch media can be ascribed to two interrelating 
factors. The first one lies in the nature of the directive. The directive laid down only 
minimum standards with a wide amount of discretion left to Member States and did, 
therefore, not lead to major changes in Dutch policies. The directive was obviously not 
perceived as producing concrete rights and obligations which were not already existent in 
Dutch laws. In that sense, the directive scarcely had ‘news-value’. The relating second factor 
explaining a lack of embedding of the directive in the media is the nature of media coverage 
itself. A scrutiny of the relevant coverage shows that when the directive did draw media 
attention, this happened at occasions when the Directive put a stop to certain Dutch 
practices, with as clear examples the possibility of the Dutch proposal of setting up 
integration tests abroad or the Dutch interpretation of a ‘genuine family band’ being in 
breach with the directive. Dutch media obviously had a keen eye for ‘Brussels encroaching 
upon Dutch sovereignties’ (be it labelled as either a positive or negative development), but 
considered it far less attractive to comment upon complicated and incremental negotiating 
processes which were moreover often dealt with in a technocratic manner. The complicated 
nature of the Directive and the absence of clear-cut winners and losers therefore hampered 
the embedding of the topic in Dutch media, a process which has certainly been fueled by a 
lack of proper understanding of the directive. 
 
As illustrative example of this last remark, an article published in De Volkskrant on 17th June 
2006 is presented and commented upon hereunder. The article concerns the recent judgment 
of the Court of Justice of the European Community (ECJ) on an action against the Council 
brought before the ECJ by the European Parliament. The EP had asked the ECJ to annul a 
number of provisions in the family reunification directive as adopted by the Council, on the 
grounds that these provisions were in conflict with inter alia art. 8 ECHR. This judgment has 
already been labeled a landmark judgment by a number of leading human rights experts in 
Europe, not only because it is the first judgment of the ECJ on a EU directive agreed upon in 
the field of migration and asylum but, more importantly, because the ECJ lays down an 
extensive human rights framework for the implementation and interpretation of the 
directive, a framework which holds value for all directives adopted in the area of migration 
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and asylum and does, perhaps ironically, pay due regard to the Dutch declaration as has been 
inserted in the Council minutes. Although the ECJ considered the appeal of the European 
Parliament unfounded, the judgment in effect severely circumcises the discretionary power 
the directive was initially thought to leave to Member States. The ECJ makes clear that when 
Member States make use of the leeway the directive offers, they are obliged to pay due regard 
to art. 8 ECHR and other human rights obligations and must make an individual assessment 
of each application. In practical terms, this means for example that the Netherlands are not 
allowed to categorically exclude all partners younger than 21 years of age from the possibility 
of family formation. And Austria, for example, may not refuse family reunification for the 
simple reason that its immigration quota has been reached. It can be inferred from the 
judgment that, when taking such decisions, both countries must individually examine all 
relevant interests and circumstances; an assessment which must moreover be able to 
overrule policy rules. In sum, the judgment is nothing less than a pyrrhus-victory for the 
Council. The tone of the article in the Volkskrant is completely different and contains a 
stunning number of inaccurate statements.  
 
((source: De Volkskrant – 27 juni 2006) 
EU-land mag ouder kind weigeren bij gezinshereniging* 
ANP 
BRUSSEL/LUXEMBURG - EU-lidstaten mogen kinderen van twaalf jaar of ouder weigeren een 
verblijfsvergunning te geven bij gezinshereniging van families van buiten de Europese Unie. Ook 
kunnen lidstaten eisen dat een verzoek voor gezinshereniging altijd wordt gedaan voor kind van 
maximaal vijftien jaar oud.** 
Dat heeft het Europees Hof van Justitie in Luxemburg dinsdag besloten. 
Het Hof behandelde een klacht van het Europees Parlement tegen een regeling voor gezinshereniging. 
De EU lidstaten besloten in 2003 dat kinderen van buiten de Unie van twaalf jaar of ouder een 
integratietoets moeten doorstaan voor hereniging met hun ouders als deze al een Europese 
verblijfsvergunning hebben.***/**** 
Het Europees Parlement vond dit in strijd met ‘het grondrecht op eerbiediging van het gezinsleven’. 
Het Hof stelt de lidstaten echter in het gelijk,***** 
omdat ‘een kind van boven de twaalf jaar niet noodzakelijkerwijs lang bij zijn 
ouders zal blijven’.****** 
 
Comments 
* The header suggests a new development, while in fact EU Member States 
have always enjoyed certain discretionary power to refuse elder minors for 
family reunification. The directive merely retains this margin of appreciation 
for Member States. 
** Due to a stand still clause, only Austria may make use of the possibility to 
exclude children above the age of 15 from family reunification. 
*** The directive does not lay down that children above the age of 12 must 
comply with integration requirements, but allows Member States to (under 
very strict conditions), employ such a policy. In fact, due to a stand still 
clause only Germany is allowed to make use of this provision. 
**** There is no such thing as a ‘European residence permit’. 
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***** As outlined above, although the ECJ does dismiss the EP’s action, the 
judgment by no means will please the Member States but in reality is a 
victory for the right to family reunification and, acting as its ‘guardian’ in this 
case brought before the ECJ, also for the EP. 
****** The last sentence is a quotation of the ECJ’s judgment which is 
incomprehensible when placed out of its context and as such only likely to 
create a sense of alienation on the side of the reader of the article.  
 
2.2  Political realm 
Explanations for a lack of embedding of the directive in the Dutch political realm have in part 
been presented in par. 1.7. It was concluded there that the Dutch EU-policy regarding the 
directive (both in government as in parliament) had been disconnected from the general 
debate on family migration in the Netherlands and was mainly perceived as a threat to Dutch 
sovereignties rather than as an opportunity for laying down a common European framework 
facilitating the rule of law and promoting interests of third country nationals on the one hand 
and safeguarding interests of state security and societal cohesion on the other hand.  
 
This ‘disconnection’ between Dutch EU-policies and national policies and the perception of 
the EU-level being a ‘threat’ to the national level which had to be countered stems partly from 
a lack of synchronity in the decision-making processes in the field of family migration on the 
national and the European plane. The major Dutch reforms to the regime of family 
reunification were only agreed upon in the summer of 2002 and further elaborated during 
the years 2003 and 2004, after political agreement on the directive at EU level was reached. 
This means that the directive was negotiated upon during a period in which the Dutch regime 
on family migration was still very much ‘under construction’, without having however, an 
accompanying final building plan. This did in fact lead to a sense of political uncertainty on 
the side of Dutch ministers and MP’s regarding the EU negotiations and an increased 
perception of the EU directive potentially encroaching upon Dutch sovereignties. 
Negotiations on the Directive in the Council show that only on those issues where agreement 
on national level had been reached, the Dutch were able to take up clear negotiating positions 
and to achieve successes.  
 
The lack of an encompassing vision or a government ‘blueprint’ on a desirable European 
regime on family reunification is also likely to be one of the reasons of the directive being 
dealt with as a technocratic issue, with only those provisions being targeted which could 
frustrate Dutch practices. During the negotiating process, the merits of the directive were 
tested by both Dutch government and a majority of parliament on their conformity with 
Dutch law and with proposed policy changes on which agreement had been reached; thereby 
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omitting a full-fledged scrutiny of the directive and in fact denying that the directive 
essentially regulates a subject of major importance: the framing of a set of rights and 
obligations for the main source of immigration in the Netherlands and the set up of a 
compromise between fundamental rights of third country nationals with interests of state 
security and social cohesion. 
 
2.3  Society 
The presented explanations above with regard to the lack of coverage in Dutch media on the 
directive hold value for the lack of embedding of the directive in Dutch society as well. The 
incremental process of decision-making, the lack of concrete winners and losers of the 
directive and the often technical nature of main points of argument in the decision-making 
process (e.g. on the level of harmonization, and the pros and cons of stand still clauses) are 
all factors which have impeded public awareness and a sense of involvement with the 
directive. Another possible explanation which should be mentioned is that the stakeholders 
which are directly targeted by the directive are third country nationals. While it is true that 
issues of immigration and integration have been the subject of high politicization in the 
Dutch public realm and the directive in fact does have implications for issues of social 
coherence and policies of integration in the Netherlands, the subject of family reunification 
itself does not relate directly to Dutch nationals, since it only creates direct rights and 
obligation for third country nationals. 
 28 
3  RECOMMENDATIONS & COUNTERFACTUAL 
In the final paragraph of this paper, the main conclusions on Dutch EU-policies with regard 
to the directive on family reunification will be summarized, while at the same time presenting 
a number of recommendations for future Dutch EU-polices. 
 
3.1 Negotiations in the Council: recipe for success 
A positive conclusion which can be drawn from the Dutch negotiations on EU level is that the 
Dutch delegation did in fact obtain a number of negotiating successes. One reason for these 
successes is undoubtedly the nature of the directive itself. From the First Amended Proposal 
presented by the Commission onwards, it was clear that the directive would allow a large 
number of Member States to retain national practices and to derogate from standards 
enshrined in the directive. Southern Member States like Greece, Italy and Spain retained the 
possibility to exclude same sex partners from the possibility of family reunification, Germany 
was allowed to impose integration requirements on children above 12 years of age and 
Austria could lengthen the waiting term for family migrants, in accordance with the quota 
system it employed. From this perspective, one should not overstate the Dutch negotiating 
successes. Dutch demands could fairly easily be reconciled in the minimum harmonization 
scheme the directive offered and did not transgress upon sovereignties or rights and duties of 
other Member States. 
 
On the other hand, it does become clear from the negotiating process that a clear stance on 
certain issues, backed by concrete national policies and/or interests does create a bargaining 
position which is instrumental for negotiating successes. Although negotiations in the 
Council have not been made public, it seems that the clear goals formulated in the 
government’s Strategic Agreement and the Dutch practice which was demonstrable not in 
conformity with a number of provisions in the draft directive, helped persuading other 
Member States to give in to the Dutch demands. 
 
3.2  Putting flesh to the bone of the right of parliamentary approval  
A second conclusion concerns the functioning of the right of approval Dutch parliament has 
with regard to EU policies in the sphere of Justice and Home Affairs.63 This right of veto of 
Dutch parliament was granted to compensate for a lack of control of the European 
Parliament in the Justice and Home Affairs-policy area. The Council of State [Raad van 
State] has on an earlier occasion concluded that the right of approval has never achieved 
much results; and that, with a view to the nature of the European policymaking procedure, 
the right as such is incapable of producing concrete results [‘Daarbij heeft deze procedure 
nooit tot heel veel resultaten geleid noch, gelet op de krachtsverhoudingen in de Europese 
besluitvorming, kunnen leiden. Het daadwerkelijk gebruikmaken van een vetorecht moet in 
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de praktijk ook als een weinig realistische aspiratie worden gezien.’].64 This position of the 
Council of State has, however, been criticized by the Commissie-Meijers.65
 
From the negotiations on the family reunification directive it can be inferred that the 
parliamentary right of approval is capable of producing at least some effects, be it on this 
dossier only a declaration of questionable legal status in the Council minutes. The proper 
conclusion which must be drawn from the way Dutch parliament has used its right to 
intervene in the European negotiating process is however, that parliament has done so after 
the European battle had been fought. The Council of State makes an important point in its 
advice to government when commenting that agreements reached at ministerial level in the 
Council do in principle not lend themselves for further scrutiny or amendment. When Dutch 
parliament would make use of its veto right after political agreement has been reached, this 
would indeed render the already cumbersome negotiating process even more ineffective and 
could very well lead to permanent postponement of certain decisions, especially since 
ministerial agreement at Council level has always been the backbone of progress in European 
integration. Illustrative of the importance of Council agreements is the fact that even in the 
co-decision procedure the European Parliament’s right of approval is not always capable of 
producing effects. With regard to the directive on free movement of EU citizens and their 
family members66, for instance, the EP rapporteur noted that it would be highly unlikely that 
the Council would alter its position on the basis of possible EP amendments, not least owing 
to the fact that some Member States have said they would prefer to reject the directive 
outright rather than to make any other concessions.67 Accordingly, the common position was 
approved by the EP without the tabling of further amendments. 
 
Thus, an institutional arrangement like a parliamentary right of approval is in itself not 
sufficient to guarantee proper involvement and a power to effectively influence the decision-
making process. The right of approval is only capable of producing effects when it is used at 
the appropriate moment in time, paying due regard to the dynamics of negotiations at EU 
level. It is therefore necessary that, when Dutch parliament is inclined to alter the outcomes 
of EU decision-making, it uses its right of veto before crucial agreements have been 
concluded. This is easier said than done and requires both a proper understanding and a 
close scrutiny of negotiations going on not only at ministerial, but also at working group level 
in Brussels. Parliament must be aware of crucial moments in time in the decision-making 
process and identify windows of opportunity for the Dutch delegation to alter the outcomes 
of negotiations. For this mechanism to work effectively, parliament needs (1.) to be informed 
in time by government about the present state of negotiations; (2.) to identify a window of 
opportunity for government to influence EU negotiations; (3.) to agree on a majority position 
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regarding the desired outcome of negotiations and (4.) make clear that it will not hesitate to 
use its parliamentary veto right as enforcing instrument. 
 
When applying these 4 ‘success-factors’ to Dutch parliamentary involvement with the family 
reunification directive, it is clear that the first factor (information) was not a major obstacle 
in this dossier. Information about progress in the negotiations, draft texts, working 
documents, etc. had been made available to both the Eerste and Tweede kamer in accordance 
with standing procedures. On the basis of this information, Dutch parliament should in 
principle have been able to assert proactive influence over the eventual outcome. 
 
With regard to the second point (the identification of a window of opportunity) a number of 
remarks can be made. The first is that Dutch parliament apparently was unaware of the 
sudden acceleration of negotiations in the final months of 2002 and first months of 2003. 
While important discussions had taken place on Working Group level on 23 October 2002 
and 26 November 200268, sessions in which a number of important amendments to the 
directive had been discussed, Dutch parliament decided not to debate the directive in its 
December session because the directive – to quote MP Blok (VVD) – ‘is nu op het laatste 
moment van de agenda [van de Raad-MdH] afgehaald’ [‘has been removed from the agenda 
of the Council’].69 A second remark concerns the appropriate moment in time for Dutch 
parliamentary intervention. While it cannot be concluded that a demand for insertion of a 
provision referring explicitly to art. 8 ECHR would have been without chances in the final 
stage of negotiations, such a demand would likely have been more effective at an earlier 
moment in time. Especially in the commencing stages of negotiations, the relationship 
between art. 8 ECHR and standards to be incorporated in the directive were regularly 
discussed. In response to the Commission’s first proposal, for instance, the question was 
debated whether the directive should actually install a fundamental right which would go 
further than obligations emanating from the ECHR.70 A prominent stance on the exact 
meaning of art. 8 ECHR for the directive taken up by Dutch government is therefore logically 
to have been the most effective in these commencing stages. 
 
With regard to the third point (devising a common position, mandate or instruction to 
government), two problems can be identified. The first one is that, with regard to a demand 
for an explicit reference to art. 8 ECHR, a majority of the Tweede kamer did not seem to 
consider such a reference as a necessity. The reason a majority in the Eerste Kamer did agree 
on its necessity was the different stance taken by CDA in this Chamber. A perhaps more 
important observation is that the structure of parliamentary scrutiny over JHA-issues seems 
to hamper the construction of a common position on the basis of which government can be 
instructed. While one can blame individual MP’s for not asserting a higher intensity of 
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control over government’s actions, for instance by way of presenting moties on which votes 
are cast, the structure of debates in the combined sessions of the permanent committees on 
Justice and Home Affairs seems simply less suitable for achieving a common position or the 
drafting of a mandate to government. In general – also due to the ever increasing activity of 
the EU in the sphere of Justice and Home Affairs – a huge number of items are on the 
agenda, thereby frustrating integral and in depth discussions on a single topic. In fact, before 
political agreement in the Council was reached, no ‘exclusive’ debate on the directive had 
taken place in parliament. 
 
With regard to the fourth ‘success-factor’ (using the parliamentary veto right as enforcing 
instrument) it is clear from the position taken up by the Eerste Kamer in the period March-
May 2003 that this veto right can be instrumental in enforcing government to take up a 
certain position in the Council. From earlier discussions in the Tweede kamer it can be 
derived however, that this right is ineffective without an accompanying common position 
taken up by parliament. 
 
Two remarks to conclude with. The first one concerns the specific role the Eerste Kamer has 
in the Dutch parliamentary system. Since the Eerste Kamer will normally only occupy itself 
with the decision-making process after the Tweede kamer has presented its final opinion, the 
right of parliamentary approval with regard to JHA-issues will remain largely ineffective 
when asserted by the Eerste Kamer, since scrutiny of the Eerste Kamer will de facto only take 
place after agreement at EU level has been reached. This implies that, when the Eerste 
Kamer is inclined to use its veto right, it must involve itself earlier with EU negotiations – 
thereby admittedly encroaching upon the democratic primacy of the Tweede kamer. This last 
objection could in part be removed when the Eerste Kamer confines this earlier scrutiny to 
the ‘non-political’ merits of EU proposals, such as the conformity with fundamental rights 
and with Dutch laws and practice. 
 
The final remark concerns the propelling role the Commissie-Meijers played in the scrutiny 
over the directive by the Eerste Kamer. It is highly unlikely that without the firm attitude and 
concrete objections raised by the Commissie-Meijers, the Eerste Kamer would have persisted 
in its demand for re-opening of Council negotiations. In this respect, the importance of the 
role of the Commissie-Meijers is twofold. Firstly, the Commissie-Meijers – as an expert 
committee in JHA-issues – pinpointed to the main drawbacks of the directive, thereby 
explaining the concrete meaning of certain provisions in the directive and their relation to 
human rights. Such a policy assessment was clearly better manageable and understandable 
than the ‘dry’ text of the draft directive and on the basis of this assessment the Eerste Kamer 
felt confident to request for amendment of the directive. Secondly, the Commissie-Meijers 
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was aware of the crucial importance of the upcoming JHA-council of 27-28 February 2003 
and sent its advice to parliament on 17 February 2003. Whereas parliamentary follow-up to 
the letter sent by the Commissie-Meijers only ensued after the JHA-council had taken place, 
the Commissie-Meijers obviously had a keener eye than parliament for the window of 
opportunity for amendment which was still very much present at that time. 
 
Strikingly, the Commissie-Meijers thus seems better able to make a critical assessment of 
draft proposals and to identify windows of opportunity for asserting influence over EU 
negotiations than Dutch parliament. This conclusion is not meant to downgrade the quality 
of Dutch MP’s, but instead to emphasize the apparent effectiveness of the monitoring role the 
Commissie-Meijers plays with regard to JHA-policies. The Commissie-Meijers was founded 
especially to counter the lack of democratic control and transparency of the EU decision-
making process in this policy field and has on numerous occasions presented timely and 
elaborate advices to both Dutch and European Parliament. These comments are at least 
potentially effective in changing the outcomes of EU negotiations. On the basis of a 
Commissie-Meijers scrutiny of the new Asylum Procedures Directive, for example, the EP has 
started an action for annulment of part of the Asylum Procedures Directive in March 2006.71
 
Due to its functioning as expert body and ‘insider’ in the intricate policy field of Justice and 
Home Affairs, the Commissie-Meijers is thus able to set certain issues on the political 
agenda; issues and/or courses of action which might otherwise be overlooked. Moreover, 
expert groups like the Commissie-Meijers might therefore be able – better than ‘ordinary’ 
NGO’s – to fuel debates on certain issues, thereby politicizing European policies in the 
national arena. 
 
3.3 Different approaches to new EU legislation: viewing European integration 
as chance instead of a danger; politicizing European issues; 
communicating Europe to Dutch citizens. 
 
The last conclusion of this paper concerns the lack of embedding of the directive both in 
Dutch society and in debates in the national political arena on the topic of family migration. 
With regard to the lack of embedding of the directive in Dutch society, it is certainly true that, 
if there is an impression the directive has left among Dutch citizens, it is, owing to media 
coverage, the impression of EU rules dictating the course of action of Dutch government and 
frustrating new Dutch policies, whereby an ignorant citizen could be tempted to think that 
these EU rules have ‘popped out of space’. Paradoxically, a fairly similar conclusion can be 
drawn with regard to the attitude of Dutch government and a majority of the Tweede Kamer 
towards the directive. Being occupied with the construction of a far more stringent regime for 
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family migrants, the predominant attitude of government towards the directive was that the 
directive potentially was a threat to Dutch sovereignties and the government’s actions where 
therefore first and foremost directed at countering this threat. 
 
The perception of the directive being a threat or running counter to Dutch interests stands in 
sharp contrast with the positive spirit in which the Member States had agreed to intensify 
their cooperation in the sphere of Justice and Home Affairs at the end of the 1990s. At 
Tampere, the European leaders agreed to transform Europe into an ‘Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’, which should especially be designed to address the daily concerns of 
citizens and to bring ‘Europe closer to its citizens’. The European Council stated that: 
‘The challenge of the Amsterdam Treaty is now to ensure that freedom, which includes the right 
to move freely throughout the Union, can be enjoyed in conditions of security and justice 
accessible to all. It is a project which responds to the frequently expressed concerns of citizens 
and has a direct bearing on their daily lives’; 
and: 
‘The area of freedom, security and justice should be based on the principles of transparency 
and democratic control. We must develop an open dialogue with civil society on the aims and 
principles of this area in order to strengthen citizens’ acceptance and support. In order to 
maintain confidence in authorities, common standards on the integrity of authorities should be 
developed.’ 72
 
One can truly wonder what, approximately seven years later, has become of these objectives. 
When we look at the family reunification directive the question can be asked in what sense 
this directive has bolstered the citizens’ sense of belonging to the Union and in what way civil 
society has been involved in the decision-making process. The same questions can be asked, 
however, with regard to the entire policy field of Justice and Home Affairs. Admittedly, this is 
a field of ‘high-politics’, traditionally belonging to the heart of State sovereignties, so one 
should not expect huge achievements in such a relatively short period of time. And in fact, 
some legislative achievements as such can be called quite remarkable, not only in the sphere 
of judicial and police cooperation, but also in the area of migration where, apart from the 
family reunification directive, a directive on long-term residents has been adopted and a 
range of regulations and directives laying down a common – minimum – regime for the 
protection of asylum seekers on EU territory. 
 
But have these achievements brought the EU closer to its citizens? Do citizens perceive the 
EU as more than a mere economic union and has cooperation in policy fields ‘directly 
relating to citizen’s interests’ increased the EU citizen’s sense of involvement with the 
European project? Regarding the Netherlands – looking at the outcome of the referendum on 
the European Constitution – the answer is obviously negative. While part of the explanation 
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for this answer must be that the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has as yet produced 
insufficient concrete benefits for Dutch citizens (or, at least, Dutch citizens haven’t 
recognized these benefits as such), another part of the explanation lies in the way the Dutch 
government has communicated this new integrationist project to its citizens. If we look at the 
government’s approach to the family reunification directive the obvious rhetorical question 
is: How can government bolster a sense of belonging to the Union, or a sense of involvement 
with this concrete directive, when government itself perceives the directive as a threat rather 
than as a chance to promote common European interests? And how can government expect 
citizens to feel ‘involved’ with the European project, while it fails itself to treat this specific 
directive as elementary and integral component of the Dutch regime on family migration? 
This is not to say that Dutch government should automatically embrace every Commission 
proposal, on the contrary, but a proper embedding of ‘Europe’ in the public realm obviously 
starts with the political acknowledgement of the importance of new integrationist projects 
and accordingly, a proper embedding of Europe in the political realm. There still is an 
important barrier between the EU political playing field and the national political playing 
field. Tearing down this barrier does seem a conditio sine qua non for an increased sense of 
involvement on the side of Dutch citizens. 
 
In this regard, it needs to be mentioned that the family reunification directive certainly 
‘deserved’ more attention than it has received. Not only because it touches upon a sensitive 
policy area, but also because it touches upon a new European policy area. In fact, the 
fundamental question whether the EU should play a role in issues of asylum and migration 
has been answered at the level of European elites – albeit with differences in opinion on the 
level of integration – but    has scarcely been debated in civil society. Figures show that 
although 83% of Dutch citizens consider the combat of illegal migration a priority of EU 
action and 81% considers the protection of human rights a priority for EU action, citizens 
remain divided on the question whether the EU should be competent in the general field of 
immigration; with 59% answering this question in the positive and 39% in the negative.73
 
The question is therefore not: did citizens care about the directive on family reunification and 
what are their opinions on it?; the fundamental questions which have to addressed – and 
resolved – are: how can citizens care and when can they care about such a directive? 
Obviously, for citizens to ‘feel’ involved with Europe it is necessary that European 
developments are communicated to Dutch citizens at the appropriate moment in time, which 
obviously starts with a politicization of the issue on the national political level as soon as 
negotiations in Brussels have started. Full-fledged parliamentary scrutinies after political 
agreements have been reached are incapable of promoting ‘an open dialogue with civil 
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society’ and are on the contrary more likely to advance a sense of alienation with the 
European project.  
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